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ARBITRA T/ON VS. RULE OF LAW?

RESPONSES

FAIRNESS IN CIVIL RIGHTS
ARBITRATION
Douglas E. Abrams

I

n 1987, 62-year-old Robert Gilmer was
fired by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation, after six years as the company's financial services manager. Out
of a job, he tried to sue Interstate in federal court. He alleged that the company
had violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, which protects older
workers from discrimination in hiring, firing, or granting benefits. In 1991, the
Supreme Court held that Gilmer could
not sue in court because when he was
hired, he had signed an agreement to
arbitrate future disputes that might arise
between him and the company. An arbitrator would now hear evidence from both
parties and render a decision binding on
them.
Arbitration's shortcomings, well articulated by Professor Carbonneau, are particularly disturbing when plaintiffs allege
violation of a civil-rights statute like the
age-discrimination act. Before the Gilmer
decision, the Supreme Court had never
expressly upheld civil-rights arbitration
under the U.S. Arbitration Act. Because
Gilmer indicated that the Court would
now uphold arbitration of claims under
any civil-rights statute, large corporate
employers routinely require advance written agreements to arbitrate claims arising from the employment relationship. A
prospective employee who refuses to sign
is likely not to get the job at all. Arbitration clauses enable employers to avoid
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court resolution of claims under not only
the age-discrimination act, but also federal and state statutes prohibiting discrimination based on race, national origin, creed, gender, or disability.
Civil-rights statutes are simply too
important to be entrusted to arbitration.
As Professor Owen Fiss ofYale has written, judges hold office under public
authority, conduct trials open to the public, and explain their decisions on the
public record; arbitrators serve as private
decision makers, conduct proceedings
closed to the public, and normally communicate their decisions only to the parties. An employer thus could hide persistent civil-rights violations from public
scrutiny by compelling all its employees
to sign agreements to arbitrate future
claims. Arbitration agreements also
enable employers to keep civil-rights
plaintiffs away from juries, which normally may award punitive damages for
intentional discrimination while arbitrators normally do not. Not only that, but
courts rarely overturn arbitration decisions, even where the arbitrator applied
the law incorrectly or made clear mistakes in fact-finding.
From my own experience serving on
three-member arbitration panels, I
believe most arbitrators strive to conduct
evenhanded proceedings and to apply the
law correctly. As a general matter, I even
believe in arbitration's essential fairness
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when parties voluntarily agree to arbitrate. These beliefs, however, are not the
point. The point is that civil-rights claims
are fundamentally different from other
claims. Civil-rights statutes are public
mandates to redress historic discrimination against particular classes or groups of
persons. If we are to remain true to our
ideals of equal justice under law, the final
word in civil-rights cases must rest with
publicly accountable courts rather than
privately empowered arbitrators.

A FEW BASICS ABOUT ARBITRATION

::i

O

ur system has two intimately
related types of arbitration.
"Labor arbitration," grounded
in major federal labor
statutes, is the narrower of the two
because it occurs only when the dispute
arises from a collective-bargaining agreement. Because Robert Gilmer and Interstate were not parties to a collective-bargaining agreement, they engaged in the
second type, "commercial arbitration,"
which is grounded in the U.S. Arbitration
Act. Despite their differences, the two
types of arbitration share many similarities. Later in this article, we will see that
in the civil-rights sphere, labor arbitration holds important lessons for its commercial counterpart.
A party must arbitrate, and thus
forgo court resolution, only if (like Gilmer)
the party has agreed to arbitrate. Parties
may sign an arbitration agreement either
before or after a dispute arises. Agreements signed after the dispute arisesso-called postdispute agreements-cause
little controversy, even in civil-rights
cases. Our legal system permits parties
to settle their claims, including claims
under civil-rights acts. Indeed, more than

90 percent of civil lawsuits in the federal
and state courts end in settlement rather
than in a court decision. Given this scorecard, the parties' postdispute arbitration
agreement is akin to an agreement to
have their existing dispute settled by a
third party, the arbitrator.
More troublesome are "predispute"
arbitration agreements, which parties
may sign long before any dispute actually arises. Robert Gilmer signed this sort
of agreement when Interstate hired him,
six years before he was fired. The problem with predispute agreements is that
the party holding superior bargaining
power (for example, the prospective
employer) frequently imposes them, often
in a standard form contract presented on
a "take it or leave it" basis. The party in
the weaker position (for example, the
prospective employee) may not pay particular attention to the arbitration clause
amid all the contract's other provisions. If
the weaker party does pay attention, he
may not fully understand that by agreeing to arbitration, he forfeits the right to
a day in court on civil-rights claims years
later. Even if he does understand, he is
likely to sense that he would lose the job
opportunity altogether ifhe balks at the
arbitration clause.

PRODUCING FAIR CIVIL-RIGHTS
ARBITRATION

B

ecause predispute arbitration
agreements so often result from
one-sided negotiation, we should
not allow them to shut the courthouse door to private civil-rights enforcement. Labor arbitration holds an important lesson here. Where an employee
loses on a statutory discrimination claim
in labor arbitration, the employee may
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bring a court suit afterward to try to
establish that claim. The arbitration
hearing is not necessarily wasted effort,
because it may resolve the dispute once
and for all. Where the employee does go to
court after the arbitration, the court may
give the arbitrator's decision appropriate
weight. If the judge determines that the
arbitrator fully and fairly heard the evidence and considered the employee's
rights, the court may decide the discrimination claim the same way the arbitrator
did. But the judge may also correct any
errors the arbitrator made and may
decide that the arbitrator's decision was
wrong. In labor arbitration, then, the final
word in applying civil-rights law rests
with the courts, where it belongs.
The potential for unfairness in commercial arbitration of civil-rights claims is
largely the fault of Congress. The lawmakers missed a golden opportunity
when they enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 made matters even worse.
Congress each time backed down
from enacting safeguards that many lawmakers clearly knew are conducive to fairness when predispute agreements produce arbitration of civil-rights claims.
These lawmakers publicly stated that
civil-rights claimants in commercial arbitration, like their counterparts in labor
arbitration, should have the right to a
later trial in which the court would give
appropriate weight to the arbitrator's decision. But these statements were made
only in House and Senate floor debates
and in published House Judiciary Committee reports preceding passage of the
1990 and 1991 acts. Statements made in
floor debates and reports do not have the

force oflaw. When all the dust had settled,
Congress lacked the fortitude to place the
safeguards in the acts themselves.
Congress should now finish the work
it began six years ago. Employees should
hold the right to seek judicial redress if
they lose a statutory civil-rights claim in
commercial arbitration, with courts
instructed to give appropriate weight to
the arbitrator's decision. Employers, who
do not hold the right to sue if they lose on
civil-rights claims in labor arbitration,
should not hold the right to sue after losing in commercial arbitration either.
Employment discrimination statutes protect employees, not employers. The
employee will normally be the weaker
party to the predispute arbitration agreement, frequently unable to meet the burdens and expense of litigation. If the
employer could sue after losing in arbitration, the employer could frequently
undo the employee's arbitral victory, not
because the law is on the employer's side,
but because the employee could not afford
to defend the lawsuit. Because it is the
employer who ordinarily insists on the
predispute arbitration agreement in the
first instance, the employer may fairly be
bound by the arbitrator's decision.
As a society, we demonstrate our dedication to the rule of law when we insist
on fair processes for resolving the disputes
that inevitably arise in our everyday life.
We should remain particularly vigilant
when rights guaranteed by our nation's
civil-rights laws are at stake. When disputes require binding resolution by a neutral decision maker, publicly constituted
courts rather than private arbitrators
should be the ultimate guardians of these
precious rights. ■

Douglas E. Abrams is a professor at the University of Missouri Law School in Columbia. His articles
have been quoted in decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts. Last year he wrote about
civil-rights arbitration in the Connecticut Law Review.
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